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ABSTRACT
This paper decomposes both the market sensitivity and the interest-rate
sensitivity of bank stock into on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet
components. It derives these constituent and often-offsetting sensitivities
from a nonstationary three-equation model that employs accounting and
capital-market information to explain cross-sectional and temporal variation
in the value of stockholder equity.
To control statistically for heteroskedasticityandintrasample
differences in unbooked capital positions, the model is estimated separately
for three size classes of large U.S. banks. Parameter estimates confirm the
importance of "hidden" or unbooked capital at these banks. For the nation's
very largest banks, shifts in the value of these parameters are consistent
with the view that the capitalized value of federal deposit-insurance
guarantees burgeoned in the l980s with interest volatility, demonstrations
of regulatory forbearance, and relaxation of deposit-rate ceilings.
Edward J. Kane Haluk Unal
Finance/Economics Department of Finance
343 Hagerty Hall College of Business and Management
Ohio State University University of Maryland
Columbus, Ohio 43210 College Park, MarylandMODELING STRUCTURAL AND TEMPORAL VARIATION
IN THE MARKET'S VALUATION OF BANKING FIRMS
I.Introduction
This paper seeks to enrich the profession's interpretation of the
marketandinterest-ratesensitivityof deposit-institution stock.
Economists conventionally assess these sensitivities as the regression
coefficients fitted to market returns and interest rates in an expanded
market model. A market model uses capital-market data to estimate a usually
stationary stochastic process presumed to generate periodic returns to
stockholders. A stationary and nonstructural model seems poorly suited to
analyzing a period when macroeconomic conditions, policy rules, financial
technology, and regulatory freedoms change rapidly. We derive market and
interest-rate sensitivities from a nonstacionary model that uses accounting
and capital-market information to explain the value of stockholder equity.
Our analysis develops two distinctions that partition the market value
of a firm's stock (i.e. ,itsmarket capitalization, MV) into three
components. The first distinction decomposes MV into hidden and recorded
capital reserves. The second distinction decomposes hidden capital reserves
into values that are "unbooked but bookable" on a historical-cost basis
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and those which are
currently treated as unbookable off-balance-sheet items under GAAP.
Our statistical model develops explicit estimates of both components of
hidden capital. We estimate the net unbooked value of bookable (or on-
balance-sheet) positions by estimating an intermediate valuation ratio, k.
This variable expresses the ratio of the market to book value of the
collected components of a firm's bookable equity, Be• Applying the valuation2
ratio to By, the value of accounting or book net worth, assigns a market
value to bookable assets and liabilities. Subtracting this estimate of
from market capitalization values off-balance-sheet items. Thisappraised
value of unbookable equity, tJe captures the net value of unbookableassets
and liabilities.
We develop estimates of k and for 43 quarters of 1975-85. We do this
by regressing cross-sectionally the market value of banks' equity shareson
the book value of their accounting net worth. We call thisregression
equation, the Statistical Market Value Accounting Model, SMVAM. We link this
model to the market model by endogenizing changes in k and as functions
of cx post returns on stocks and bonds.
We envisage the parameters of these second-stage modelsas undergoing
evolutionary change during 1975-85. Goldfeld and Quandt's [(1972), (1973),
(1976)] switching regression method, GQSRN, is used to study thetemporal
variability of model parameters. CQSRM estimates three attributes ofregime
variation: specific shift dates, the gradualness of eachshift, and the
parameters of the stochastic process governing each regime.
Expanded market models make no direct use of accounting informationon
the bookable positions of a firm and make no effort toseparate bookable and
unbookable items. Rapid expansion in banks' fee-based serviceactivity and
in the policy problems that off-balance-sheet activitiespose for deposit
insurers (Kane, 1985) should create a demand for market-basedmeasures of
off-balance-sheet activities.
We interpret our model as a flexible functional form thatincorporates
structural detail aggregated away in a market model. It usesaccounting data
to focus structurally on market participants' ex ante andnonstationaryvaluation dectsions rather than forcing ex post returns to fit a stationary
process. Our analysis endogenizes temporal movements in the degree of market
and interest sensitivity of capital positions that develop on and off a
bank's conventional balance sheet. Specifying and estimating this additional
structuregeneratesevidence of disaggregated market and interest
sensitivity that cannot be observed by directly fitting a two-index model of
ex post equity returns. This additional evidence reconciles some conflicting
findings in market-model studies of market and interest sensitivity.
II. The Statistical Market-Value Accounting Model
If markets are efficient, financial analysts see through smoke and
mirrors raised by contemporary accounting rules. Our analysis develops
separate estimates for bookable and unbookable elements of the market and
interest sensitivity of a depository firm's generalized balance sheet.
At any time, a firm's market capitalization, MV, is the product of its
share price and number of shares outstanding. Invoking the principle of
value additivity, MV may also be expressed as the market value of bookable
and unbookable assets, (A +A'), minus the market value of bookable and mm
unbookable nonequity liabilities,(Lm+L)•
becausedeposit- insurance
subsidies are widely believed to have surged during the 1980s and to vary
with bank size, it is instructive to isolate from other unbookable assets
the value of a deposit institution's explicit and conjectural federal
guarantees net of discounted future costs, FCG (cf. Benston.,1986;
Brickley and James, 1986; and Thomson, 1987). In symbols,
MV —(F+(A'—L')]+(A—L ). (1) CG m in in in4
Since recorded assets and liabilities are carried at historical cost, even
(Am_Lm) cannot be observed directly. A parsimonious way to proceed is to
assume that market participants estimate the market value of elements of
bookable equity by applying appropriate mark-up or mark-down ratios, ka and
to the accounting values reported by the institution. Adopting this




where subscripts a, 1, and b represent assets, liabilities, and booked
values, respectively.
In principle, A.0 and L.0 are jointly determined variables, affected by
many of the same unknown exogenous variables. Treating A.0 and Lb as separate
and exogenous regressors could introduce interpretive problems. Fortunately,
our data give no evidence of these problems. At every date for every bank
class, the coefficient constraint that ka —k1proves impossible to reject.
This justifies our applying a single valuation ratio k to the value of an
institution's book equity, By —Ab
—
Lb.
Expressing the market value of unbookable equity ((Fcc+A_L)] as Ue
and allowing for approximation error introduced in the model, we obtain
equation (3):
MV—U +k3V+e . (3)
We term this equation, which can be estimated from time-series or cross-
sectional data sets, the Statistical Market-Value Accounting Model, SMVAM.
As with many statistical models employed in finance, equation (3) can
be justified most satisfactorily as a "flexible functional form." Thespecifications'svirtues liein having a small number of readily
interpretable parameters and in incorporating several testable restrictions.
Our specification treats e as an approximation error. Our goal is to show
that (3) can be imbedded into a specification that uses more information
than a market model, not that (3) completely represents the process
determining MV.
Parameter Restrictions
In applying the model cross-sectionally, we restrict the valuation
ratio ki applicable to bank i at time t to have the same value k across
each bank class. To lessen damage from this restriction, it is necessary to
focus on relatively homogeneous subsamples of banks.
A set of what should be seen as identifying restrictions follow from
reformulating (3) as a two-equation model of Ueand Be:
U —a +b BV+e (4) e u U 1
B —a+bBV +e
e e e 2
With only one instrumental variable, four coefficients cannot be identified.
Equation (3) overcomes this problem by restricting b and ae each to zero.
To the extent that either U is not uncorrelated with book value or ais
e e
nonzero, the neglected coefficients bleed into our estimates of k and
Although such bleeding limits our capacity to separate the components of
hidden reserves, it does not invalidate (3) considered as a reduced form.
A third restriction is that (3) and (4) are linear. However, using a
linear approximation to what is presumed to be a monotonically increasing
function is less damaging when the range of upside and downside variation is
controlled by outside forces. On the upside, takeover discipline limits6
large holdings of capital because high levels of capital reduce deposit-
insurance subsidies. On the downside, the FDIC introduces increasing
regulatory penalties whenever a bank's BV heads toward zero (Buser, Chen,
and Kane, 1981). (Because the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
has in recent years virtually abandoned capital discipline, the model might
work less well for S&Ls.)
A fourth restriction lies in treating BVi as exogenous. Because GAAP
gives bank managers options to realize unbooked gains and losses on bookable
and unbookable positions and authorities penalize low BV, ki and and
tradable elements of Ue and BVi may be negatively correlated. Our estimated
rank orderings of k against bank size class vary over time.
Inter'retabi1ity Issues
The model's coefficients describe the facto deceptiveness of GAAP.
Unless both U—O and k—l, the accounting or book value of a bank's capital
represents a biased estimate of the market value of stockholder equity. If
the estimated intercept is significantly positive (negative),unbookable
assets and liabilities serve as a net source of (drain on) institutional
capital. Financial analysts know that problems exist in both directions. On
the drain side, U.S. institutions habitually overstatethecapital
contribution derived from their loan-loss reserves by not deducting an
allowance for anticipated loses that they have not yet formally realized. On
the sources side, institutions do not book the value of the deposit-
insurance guarantees they receive.
If only intercept bias were to exist, changes in accounting values7
would be unbiased estimates of changes in the market value of on-balance-
sheet assets and liabilities. However, a slope bias may also exist. We
interpret (1-k) as a premium when k>l and as a discount factor when k<l.
Sampling Issues
It is difficult to develop a representative sample of data from which
to estimate SMVAM. Stock in few U.S. deposit institutions trades directly or
regularly in the market. Many thrift institutions are stillmutual
organizations, while small stockholder institutions are often privately
held. For large institutions, to exploit regulatory and tax benefits, stock
is typically owned indirectly through a holding company, HC. A bank (or a
saving and loan) MC may own more than one depository and may own
nondepository assets as well.
This leads us to reinterpret Ue For an HC, Ue may capture activity
that is on the HG's balance sheet but not on the balance sheet of the HC's
principal bank. We view estimates of SMVAM parameters as if equity in a
bank's affiliates were an off-balance-sheet position of the bank. We do this
because data on subsidiaries are not available quarterly and to link the
model with regulatory conceptions of affiliate activity.
Even if the market value of other HG subsidiaries and the unbookable
equity of the bank were uncorrelated with the bank's book equity, the mean
value of equity in HG affiliates would bleed into the measure of the bank's
unbookable equity provided by the intercept term. The size of this intercept
reflects the mean importance of all unbooked sources of value not correlated
with By.Similarly, (l-R2) tells us how much variation in these items is
orthogonal to variation in BV.a
Ifsubsidiary values and unbookable equity correlate with book equity,
regression estimates of the valuation ratio would be biased. Under these as-
yet unknowable circumstances, deviations of k from unity could signal either
the existence of capital gains and losses on bookable positions or size-
based variation in the value of affiliate equity and unbookable positions.
III. Buildjn Market and Interest-Rate Sensitivity into the SMVAM
Theparameters of the SMVAN are Ue and k. When stock and bond returns
change, these parameters must respond. To express the market and interest-
rate sensitivity of a deposit institution's bookable and unbookable equity,
we imbed this response in a triangular three-equation model.
This model portrays quarterly adjustments in each SMVAM parameter as a
linear function of market returns and interest rates:
Uet_ Ue,tl_ U + mt + Rt + Vt, (5)
kr— k1 —k+ mt + pkR + w . (6)
and R represent a market return and an interest-rate proxy and the
stochastic terms in each equation are conceived as approximation errors. The
slope coefficients and in (6) and and in (7) measure the market
sensitivity and interest-rate sensitivity of SMVAM's parameters.
As is equation (3), equations (5) and (6) are offered as flexible
functional forms. This two-equation submodel isintendedonlyto
parameterize in an interpretable and parsimonious way revaluation decisions
that take place continually. The true models that (5) and (6) -- andthe
two-index model -- merelyapproximate may be nonlinear in Rm and R and may9
include unspecified other variables as well. Because our equations are
conceived as approximations, we subject parameter estimates to Goldfeld-
Quandt tests for regime shifts. Especially in an era of rapid financial
change, we think it important to allow the parameters of such approximations
to be recalibrated whenever statistical evidence indicates that movements in
omitted variables (such as authorities' closure rules) or nonlinearities
might have degraded a previously relevant model's explanatory power.
Equations (5) and (6) have the same logical standing as the following
two-index market model, which expresses the return on asset p as:
..p+p+ . (7)
p 0 mm r p
In (7), the betas measure the asset's systematic market and interest-rate
sensitivity and is a stochastic disturbance. Except thatmay be
interpreted as an "industry factor" (Lee and Brewer, 1985; Sweeney and
Warga, 1987), the market model ignores the structural characteristics of
individual institutions and the markets in which they operate. One source
opines that "studies of bank stocks describe the pricing of steel industry
stocks as well as they do the pricing of bank stocks" (Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, 1986, p. 58).
Our equations condition market participants' revaluation decisions on
the same variables that are taken as exogenous in the two-index model. In a
reduced-form sense, then, (5) and (6) must explain the overall market
sensitivity, ,andthe interest sensitivity, r' of equity returns in
model (7). These market-model betas may be deemed to be monotonically
increasing in the respective slopes of (5) and (6):10
(+) (+)
mt (fl) , (8)
(+) (+)
rt t '
Linkingthe SMVAMtothe two-index model in this way takes all partial
derivatives as positive and allows the righthand-side betas and the
weighting functions f(...) and g(...) to vary over time with market a'd
interestvolatilityand with the balance-sheet structure of sample
institutions.
IV. Data Set Used
End-of-quarter share prices, number of shares, and book values for a
set of large commercial banks are obtained from BANK COMPUSTAT, 1986. This
data set includes about 150 NYSE. AMEX and over-the-counter issues. Market
values are determined as the product of end-of-quarter share price and
number of shares outstanding. BANK COMPUSTAT provides data on the book
values of the principal bank subsidiary, defined as the total equity of the
common stockholders in the capital of the bank which includes the par value
of common stock, surplus, undivided profits, reserves for contingencies and
other capital reserves.
Our market proxy is the CRSP equal-weighted NYSE and AMEX monthly stock
index adjusted for dividends. Because empirical research shows no reliable
role for short-term rates in the two-index model (Kane and Unal, 1987), the
interest-rate index used is the monthly holding-period return on long-term
government bonds constructed by Ibbotson Associates, 1986. Monthly returns
are compounded to produce quarterly returns.
We interpret movements in holding-period yields as dominated by what
rational-expectations models term "interest-rate surprises." Although the11
construction of holding-period returns parallels the CRSP proxy, such
returns reverse the economic interpretation of the sign of an interest-rate
coefficient.Bond-price reductions induced by interest-rate increases
decrease holding-period returns. Hence, a rise in. holding-period returns
corresponds to a fall in interest rates, an event widely believed to benefit
the stock of a typical bank.
V. Parameter Estimates for SMVAM
Estimation proceeds stepwise. From a time series of cross-sectional
values for the MV and BV of individual banks, Ue and k are estimated by
ordinary least squares for each of 43 1975-1985 quarters. Then, to estimate
(5) and (6),the quarterly changes in k and Ue are regressed on stock and
bond returns.
Tocontrolstatistically for heteroskedasticity and intrasample
differences in k and we classify sample banks into three asset-size
classes. For each class, the SMVA1( is estimated separately. The three size
groups consist of the largest 25 banks, the smallest 25 sample banks, and 54
to 97 other banks that we term medium-size banks. Banks of similar size may
be presumed to operate in broadly similar ways and to be disciplined or
assisted by deposit-insurance authorities in similar fashion.
For SMVAM, Table 1 reports quarterly cross-sectional regressions for
each size class. For the largest banks, t-tests reject (albeit with low
power) the combined U—O and k—i condition necessary for recorded equity to
be an unbiased estimate of market value except in nine quarters (for medium-
size banks, eighteen quarters). Accounting representations of the economic
performance of major banks are deceptive. Moreover, our data indicate that12
the larger a bank becomes, the less reliably book values track the market
value of underlying stockholder claims.
It is also useful to examine the two prongs of the unbiasedness
condition separately. Deviations of from zero show a definite time
pattern. Before 1980, the market value of unbookable equity is negative for
every bank group in every quarter. This means that off-balance-sheet items
serve as a drain on capital values before 1980. At the largest banks, this
drainremainsstatistically significant until mid-1979, but becomes
insignificant thereafter. A broadly similar pattern holds for the other two
bank groups: Uc remains negative throughout 1975-79, while its sign becomes
less regular during 1980-85.
The ratio of mean 13e to mean MV varies sharply between the 1975-79 and
1980-85 subperiods. During the first subperiod, this ratio is -31 percent
for the largest banks, -15 percent for medium banks and -25 percent for
small banks. During the 1980-85 period, the ratio shrinks dramatically,
becoming -l percent for the largest and smallest banks, and -9 percent for
medium-size banks. After 1980, unbookable equity seldom acts as significant
reservoir of hidden losses. This observation is consistent with the
hypothesis that after 1980, the value offederaldeposit-insurance
guarantees increased with: interest volatility; demonstrations of regulatory
forbearance for large banks; and the relaxation of deposit-rate ceilings
(Kane, 1985). Of course, the precise effect of these forces at an individual
bank should vary with the bank's leverage and other portfolio riskiness.
Largest banks' dramatic improvement in the U./MV ratio may reflect different
economic forces from those operative at other banks. The upward surge of Ue13
at very large institutions may be driven by administrative and political
difficulties that persuade regulatory authorities to overlook a capital
deficiency (caused, for example, by unrealized losses on LDC loans) and to
regard these institutions as "too big to fail" (Seidman, 1986). For other
banks, the major influences may be the opening up of extralocal sources of
retail deposits and a broader range of potential acquirers, acquisitions,
and future activities.
Turning to k, the largest banks usually show a significant premium
(k>l) for recorded equity before 1980. However, k drops significantly below
unity in 1980 and in most quarters thereafter. For other size classes,
patternsdiffer.Atmedium-sizebanks,except for two scattered
observations, k stays below one until 1983. From then on, k lies above unity
most of the time. The smallest banks' pattern resembles that of medium-size
banks, but the turn comes later, in 84/4 when the departure from unity
becomes significant.
VI. Digression on Switching Regression
We investigate the temporal variability of the parameters of the
second-stage equations (5) and (6) by Goldfeld and Quandt's switching
regression method (CQSRN). This section illustrates the method for an n-
regime specification of equation (5):
et +jint jt + vj
j —1,...,n;t— 1,... ,T. (10)
In (10), 0et is Uet —t-l' indexes the n regimes and is a
disturbance term assumed to be distributed N(0, ak).Thelikelihood
function that applies when the data set is conceived as a combination of n
regimes would employ more parameters than we have observations. To develop14
positivedegrees of freedom, GQSRMuses transition-smoothingdummy
variables, Dj. If the observations come from n regimes, (n-I) switch dates
Z and (n-I) gradualness parameters exist. The n-i sets of variables Dj
are approximated as:
Dj -f[(2,r)2 g*]l exp {- 1/2 [(-Z)/a12 d , (11)
where j now runs from 1 to n—I and the endpoint values are 0 and 1
by definition. In (U) the valtie of gives information about the
smoothness of the structural change. The smaller oris, the more sudden the
transition between the regimes. If is significantly different from zero,
the hypothesis that the structural change is abrupt in the vicinity of Z
should be rejected in favor of a hypothesis of gradual change.
In (10) the equation representing the s-th regime is then multiplied by
s-i n
7ts
II(1 — The resulting equations for n regimes are added
j—o
togetherto obtain the composite equation that we estimate:
521ettss—l smsRmtrsRit+ v5) ts (12)




likelihood function for an n-regime specification then becomes:15
T 2 T 22
log L— —T/2 1og2r —1/2E log c1/2 E EVtYJ (13)
t—l t_ls
Maximizing (13) with respect to the unknown parameters generates maximum-
likelihood estimates of: the parameters of equation (10), the mean switch
dates Z, and the gradualness parameters which characterize the
nonabruptness of the associated structural change.
Maximizing the likelihood functions developed in this paper requires
numerical optimization. GRADX (an algorithm using the quadratic hill-
climbing method) in Princeton University's CQOPT package is used.
VII. Changes in the Market and Interest-Rate Sensitivity of k and Ue
Substantive interest focuses on the market sensitivity and
interest-rate sensitivity (fland and residual variance (a and c7)
of unbookable equity and the valuation ratio. Tables 2 to 5 summarize CQSRM
results. Table 6 sorts out the individual significance of the many
individual coefficient shifts allowed.
Table 2 reports two regimes for the market and interest sensitivity of
unbookable equity for the largest and the smallest 25 banks. Medium-size
banks experience three regimes. In all three size classes, the market and
interest sensitivities of the valuation ratio show the same number of
regimes (although not always the same shift dates) as unbookable equity.
Table 3 reports the dates and gradualness of the shifts. Panel A
focuses on the market and interest sensitivity of unbookable equity. For the
largest banks, the only switch occurs at 78/3. This switch point estimate
has a standard error of 2.07 quarters. This means that the two-standard-
error confidence interval for this switch date runs from roughly 77/3 to16
79/3. The estimated associated gradualness parameter is 4.33 quarters
meaning the switch is gradual. Approximating the length of the transition by
twice the gradualness parameter implies this gradual switch (given an
estimated starting point) completes itself in nine quarters.
Medium and small banks' first switch is estimated at 77/2; medium
banks' second switch at 81/1. CQRSM cannot reject the hypotheses that these
switches are abrupt.
Panel of Table 3 develops parallel results for the valuation ratio.
Large and small banks show one switch, while medium banks experience two.
The largest banks experience a gradual shift: the mean date is 77/3 and the
associated gradualness parameter is 3.47 quarters. The drift in the market
and interest sensitivity of the largest banks' valuation ratio takes 7
quarters. Medium banks' first and second switches occur abruptly at 77/2 and
80/4. Small banks' second regime starts at 77/1.
For all banks, GQRSM labels mid-1977 as a time of sea change. Around
this date, sample banks experience structural changes in their sensitivities
to stock returns and bond yields. This dating pattern supports the
political-economy view that the Fed's October 1979 change in operating
procedures is better conceived as an endogenous response to changes in the
economic and political environment affecting the stock of its client firms
rather than as an exogenous event. For the largest banks, the structural
drift tails off precisely when the Federal Reserve's regime change was
announced. Medium-size banks differ in experiencing a second structural
change at the end of 1980.
Table 4 reports sensitivities for unbookable equity in each regime. For
the largest banks, the market sensitivity of unbookable equity (fl)proves17
negative and significant early in its 75/2-78/3 drift. But over time this
sensitivity becomes positive and loses its significance by 78/4. This
indicates that largest banks' off-balance-sheet positions hedge market
variation only during the 1975-78 period. After 1978, off-balance-sheet
positions lose their relation to market returns on stock. Table 6 confirms
that the shift in market beta is significant.
In both regimes largest banks' unbookable equity proves negatively
correlated with bond returns. This implies that the value of unbookable
equity at large banks increases when ex post bond returns fall (I.e., when
interest rates rise). This is consistent with Kane's (1985) hypothesis that
increases in FDIC guarantees offset much of interest-induced losses on net
bookable assets at banks the FDIC deems infeasible to liquidate. Although we
observe no significant shift between regimes, flremainsnegative taken by
itself but loses significance during the second regime.
For medium banks, the market sensitivity of unbookable equity is
negative and significant in all three regimes. Compared to large banks,
medium-size banks' off-balance-sheetpositionsbetterhedgemarket
variationsafter 77/3. Medium banks parallel large banks in having
unbookable equity relate negatively to holding-period yields prior to 1977.
However, the relation becomes insignificantly positive in the two regimes
operative after 77/3.
The specification for unbookable equity works poorly for the smallest
banks. R2 values prove much lower and slope coefficients are insignificant
in both regimes. This may trace to greater diversity in the way members of
this class operate or to the FDIC's willingness to enforce capital
requirements closely enough to keep the capitalized value of FDIC guarantees18
close to zero for this size class. Table 6 clarifies that the 77/2 shift is
best viewed as a significant increase in residual variance.
Market and interest sensitivites for the valuation ratio are found in
Table 5.For the largest banks, is positive and significant in both
regimes. This positive sign indicates that when stock returns increase, so
does the valuation ratio for book equity. For fixed interest rates, this
means that in a bull market book values increasingly underestimate the
marketvalue of net bookable assets. The market and interest-rate
sensitivities of the valuation ratio for the largest banks decline after the
77/3 shift, but only the decline in market beta proves significant. During
both regimes, the relation between k and holding-period returns on bonds is
positive. This indicates that the institution's bookable assets are more
interest-sensitive than its bookable liabilities. This is not evidence that
the Macauley duration (as opposed to the "effective duration") of its
bookable assets exceeds the duration of its bookable liabilities. Such an
implication would hold only for infinitesimal movements in r (Kaufman,
1984). The robustness of the coefficient restraint kakl_k suggests instead
that interest-rate variation affects the repayment capacities of banks and
borrowers.
For medium banks, the valuation ratio also shows a consistently
positive market-sensitivity. During the first two regimes, is unchanged,
while the increase observed after 1981 is insignificant. The valuation ratio
correlates positively with holding-period yields during each regime, but
after the first switch on 77/2, the coefficient shifts significantly19
downward. In the last 7.5 years of the sample, the effective durations of
bookable assets and liabilities appear to be nearly matched.
For the smallest banks, the valuation-ratio model works only a little
better than the unbookable-equity model. Prior to the 76/4 switch, market
sensitivity is significant and positive. Once the switch occurs, the model
deteriorates, with no beta remaining significant. Once again, Table 6
portrays the shift as an increase in residual variance.
CpmDprison with Related Studies
Ourresultshelp to explain the diversity of interest-sensitivity
estimates reported in previous studies (Lloyd and Shick, 1977; Lynge and
Zuxnwalt, 1980; Chance and Lane, 1980; Flannery and James, 1984; Kane and
Unal, 1988). Market models estimated from CRSP and DRI data show bank equity
returns becoming interest-rate sensitive only after 1979. Prior to 1979,
market-model evidence indicates insensitivity to interest rates. Tables 4
and 5 show that, for all but the smallest banks in our sample, Ue is
negatively and k is positively correlated with cx post bond returns
prior to the first switch and that both coefficients (and are
significant. During the 1975-79 period, the impact of the separately
significant fland are therefore offsetting. The resulting "tendency to
cancel out" clarifies how researchers could estimate an insignificant
interest-rate beta for the two-index model with data drawn from this
interval. For the largest and medium-size banks that the cited authors
studied, Uc loses its significant link to bond returns during 1979-85.
Deleting this offsetting force permits movements in r to be dominated by20
movements in $.Eliminatingthis category of revaluation ought to increase
the significance of er'S in a two-index market model.
Even though both interest-sensitivity terms decline in magnitude during
the late 1970s, the overall interest sensitivity of bank stock need not
decline. A stock's overall interestsensitivityreflects thenet
contribution of both interest-rate betas. For the largest and medium-size
banks, the interest-sensitivity of off-balance-sheet items not only declines
in magnitude but begins a drift to insignificance in 1977. Hence, one cannot
reject the hypothesis that once the shifts complete themselves, the interest
sensitivity of bank stock in these size classes depended entirely on the
interest sensitivity of the valuation ratio.
VIII. Diagnostic Regression Experiments
Table 7 reports a series of regressions that investigate for the SMVAM
how well our three-way size partition controls for heteroskedasticity and
intrasample differences in k and U. The first panel estimates k and Ue for
the country's nine largest banks. These money-center banks consist of
Citibank and the eight banks that Sinkey (1986, p. 249) reports that its
staff labels as close competitors. Without exception, estimates of k lie
above and estimates of U lie below parallel estimates for the 25 largest
banks reported in Table 1 (often substantially so). The magnitude of these
differences suggests that these giant banks deserve a class of their own and
leads us to ask whether the 16 other large banks might be reclassified into
the medium group. Moreover, the very high k values assigned money-center
banks in the early quarters of our sample are inconsistent with a zerocorrelation at these dates between book value and unbookable equity (which
for these giant banks includes the value of numerous affiliates).
As an alternative to reclassification, the second panel of the table
examines what happens when for the largest 25 banks the flexible form (3) is
respecified as a quadratic equation:
MV—U +(k+k1BV)BV+eQ. (14)
(14) models the valuation ratio k as a function of By. Table 7 tells us that
for large banks k generally increases with bank size; but after 1980 never
significantly so. Substantial bleeding of unbookable equity into k seems to
be limited primarily to money-center banks during 1975-79. Parallel but
unreported runs for medium and small banks reveal different patterns. Medium
banks generally show a negative k1; this coefficient proves significant two-
thirds of the time before 1980 but only one-third of the time thereafter. At
small banks, k1 varies in sign and is almost never significant.
The third panel of Table 7 estimates the SMVAI4 for the 25 largest banks
after deflating all variables in equation (3) by By. This deflation would
correct exactly for heterosked.asticity if e in (3) were to equal the product
of a random error eD and BV. In any case, the indicated transformation
reweights individual observations, raising the weight of observations drawn
from smaller members of the large-bank sample relative to money-center
banks. Before 1980, deflated estimates of and k for large banks lie
closer to the undeflated estimates for medium than for large banks. From
1981 on, the deflated estimates for large banks look much like the
undeflated ones. This supports the view that before 1980 the SMVAM should be
estimated separately for money-center banks. Results from fitting the22
deflatedmodel to money-center banks (not presented here) confirm this. In
the money-center subsample, pre-1980 estimates of k and Ue are broadly
similar to those of the undeflated model. The main difference is that three-
fourths of the Uc estimates become significant at 5 percent. Using this
information to interpret the third panel of Table 7 assures us that deflated
pre-1980 estimates of unbookable equity at the next 16-largest banks would
be positive, with valuation ratios much more like those shown for medium-
size banks in Table 1. Taken together, these sensitivity tests underscore
the value of undertaking pooling tests to partition sample banks optimally.
We also tested the unit constraint on the lagged coefficients for Ue
and k built into the first-difference specifications (5) and (6). To do
this, we ran unconstrained regressions of Uet and k on their respective
(t-l)—values, and R over the time span of each regime identified in
Table 2. Only one of the 14 lagged coefficients differs significantly from
unity at 5 percent.
IX.Directionsfor Further Research
Thereconceptualizationestablishedin this paper offers four
directions forfuture research: sequential estimation, model
respecification, sample selection, and data partition. Under the identifying
restrictions and recursive structure employed here, sequential estimators of
U, k and the various betas can be regarded as consistent instrumental-
variable or method-of-moment estimators (Kmenta, 1971, pp. 559-567; Newey,
1984). To the extent that the recursive model is only an approximation or Ue
and k are improperly identified, the estimates of k and Ue employed as input23
into second-round regressions add a measurement error to the model-
approximation errors envisaged in (5) and (6). Although this complication
could be addressed by estimating k, 1e' and the betas simultaneously, this
would greatly expand the parameter space over which costly Goldfeld-Quandt
search routines would have to operate. In our judgment,a more promising
approach is to await the development ofattractive instrumental-variable
equations for the bookable and unbookable components of MV. Given a
specification with less-oppressive identifying restrictions than our own,
the GQRSM procedure could be adapted to explaining time-series observations
for individual banks.
Model respecifications ought to focus on the possibility of finding
omitted variables and the desirability of disaggregating accounting net
worth into detailed asset and liability components. In principle, one could
expand either stage of the model. Following the lead of arbitrage-pricing
theory, one could expand the set of macroeconomic risk factors employed as
regressors in the second-stage equations. In (3), one might also estimate
distinctivevaluationratiosfordifferent classes of assets and
liabilities. Our own preliminary attempts to make these extensions failed to
improve upon the specifications reported here. It is difficult to expand the
specification without developing a simultaneous-equations model of a bank's
asset and liability decisions. Because existing bank portfolio models treat
banks as enjoying monopoly power in at least some deposit and loan markets,
they are ill-suited to representing the operations of large banks in 1975-
1985. However, one might adapt Goldfeld's (1966) empirical model of bank
behavior to serve this end.24
At least three sample-selection issues merit attention. First, this
study includes no observations on either mutual institutions or stock
savings-and-loan associations and savings banks. Second, introducing data on
the value of individual HCs' nonbank subsidiaries would sharpen the
interpretation of Ue Third, survivorship bias could be studied by applying
the model to a set of institutions that went out of business between 1975
and 1985.
Finally, repartitioning our data would let us reinterpret our quarter-
by-quarter models in at least two ways. Oneisto test and correct our
regressions for richer forms of heteroskedasticity. A second is to use
pooling tests for parameter variation to isolate the nature of meaningful
differences in bank behavior. The size breakdown we employ represents a
preliminary attempt at developing interpretable patterns of parameter
similarities and differences, in which the partition itself is not tested
for significance. Investigations aimed at finding optimal pooling procedures
would also track changes over time in the composition of relevant classes.
X. Summary
This paper combines accounting estimates of a bank's net worth with
capital-market information to estimate a well-interpreted flexible-form
model of the values of the firm's net bookable and unbookable assets. By
permitting regime changes in the valuation models that reset market values
each quarter, our methods provide new insight into changes in: (1) the
market and interest sensitivity of a bank's stock and (2) the impact of off-
balance-sheet positions on bank stock prices.
Our results show that the interest and market sensitivities of bookable
and unbookable values often prove offsetting in sign. In particular, the25
evolution of the value and sensitivity of hidden capital at the nation's
very largest banks after 1978 is consistent with the hypothesis (Kane, 1985)
that during this period increases in the unbookable value of FDIC guarantees



















































































































































































































































































































































LikeLihood-RatioTests to DeterminethetkerofRegimes In Effect for the
Market and Interest-Rate Sensitivity of UthookableEquity and
TheValuationRatioFor the Three BankGroiçs.
Market and Interest Market andInterest
Sensitivity of Sensitivity of Valuation Ratio
UnbookabteEquity For Bookebte Equity
•2 (oQ(L*/L -2Loa(L*IL)'
I.Largest25 Banks
Test ofone vs.two regImes 18.94 25.12 • *
Testof twovs.threeregimes 8.92 6.44
II.NediunBanks
Testof one vs. tworegimes 49.62 26.86
Testof twovs. three regimes 15.34 14.32
* *
Testof three vs. four regimes 5.90 8.70
111.SmalLBanks
Test of one vs. tworegimes 17.36 17.14
* * Test oftwovs. three regimes 4.78 8.10
(1) CriticaL valuefor6 d.f. at 5 percent significance is 12.592.
(e)Thehypothesis that an additionalregimeexists Is rejected at 5 percentsignificance.28
TABLE3
0utcsesof Goldf.Ld-QuandtTeats IdentifyingNostLikeLySwitch DItand
Graa(nessof Switches In the M.rk.t and Interest-late Sensitivityof
UnboolcabteEqjity and the Valuation latio
P.n.L A: N,rket and Interest-lit, SensitivitY of UnbokabIg Ejitv
First Switch Second Switch
Largest25 Banks






IirIledDat.(2 ) 77/2 81/1
(1.23) (2.30)




Isplied Date(2 ) 77/2
(0.72)
a
Gradualnessparameter Ce ) 0.34
(0.48)




GraduaLness parameter Ce> 3.47
(1.96)
MedluaBanks
Ieli.d Data (2) 77/2 80/4
(1.09) (1.87) *
Gradualnessp.rma.t.r Ce ) 1.19 0.59
(1.47) (0.41)
SmaLlest 25 Banks
lirptled Date (2) 76/4
(3.04)
a




Maxinuu-LikeUhood Estimates of Regime Parameters for the Second-Stage ModeL
for the Market and Interest-Rate sensitivity of Urtookabte Equity.













































































Ending 'reer/Qtr. 85/3 85/3 85/3
t values In parentheses; (*)significantat 5percent.30
TABLE 5
Max,mun•Liketihood Estimates of Regime Parameters for the Secon&Stage Modet
for the Market andInterest-Ratesensitivity of the VaLuation Ratio.
ModeL: kt -ktl
+BRmt + R +
Largest25 Banks Medir Banks SmaLLest 25 Banks
Starting Year/Qtr 75/2 75/2 75/2
4 •0.23 •0.06 0.02
(3.52) (3.21) (1.61)









R2 0.81 0.90 0.69
Ending Year/Qtr. 77/3 77/2 76/4











w2 0.08 0.02 0.12
















Ending Year/Qtr. 85/3 85/3 85/3
tvaLuesIn parentheses; (*) significant at 5 percent.31
TABLE 6
Likelihood-Ratio Tests of Shifts in Second-Stage Model
Parameters for Market andInterest-RateSensitivity of
UnbookableEquityandValuation Ratio.1
1. UnbookabLe Equity










a 7.92* 1.70 17.02*
- 41.26
II. Valuation Ratio forBookabLeEquity








2.64 4.76* 0.02 kk
r2 r3
3.34 3.54 16.84
k k a 29.80*
(1)The teststatisticIs .2Log(L*/L). bdere L* and L are restrictedand


























































































TabLe 7: Diagnostic Regressions
SMVAII for 9 Money Center Banks
MV Ue+kBV • e
Ue k














0.0006* 0.88 19 0.81 0.00 234 -0.06"
.014** 0.0007'0.89 10 0.86 0.00 265
0.0007* 0.91 -10 1.03 0.00 295
0.90 -22 1.09 0.00 271 -0.01
0.0005* 0.92 -20 0.98 0.00 243
0.0006* 0.92 -28 1.08 0.01 267
0.0004* 0.93 -3 0.94 0.00 202
0.0003* 0.94 -28 0.96 0.01 140 0.41
0.0003' 0.92 -33 0.93 0.01 116
0.0002' 0.93 -1 0.85 0.00 150
0.0002' 0.91 12 0.79" 0.00 143 0.41"
0.0002' 0.93 12 0.83 0.00 146
0.0002* 0.93 -28 0.95 0.01 146
0.0002' 0.92 -31 084 0.01 162
0.43" 0.0002' 0.92 -28 082 0.01 132
0.0001' 0.93 -62 0.91 0.04 99
0.51 0.00010.91 -24 0.88 0.00 141
0.0001' 0.91 -38 0.83 0.01 147
0.0001 090 -32 0.i0** 0.04 82
0.00010.96 61 0.73" 0.01 145
0.0001 0.90 66 0.67" 0.03 227
0.00010.89 38 0.79 0.01 268
0.00010.87 104 0.75 004 310
0.00000.85 49 0.55 0.01 159
0.00000.56 161 0.67*0.06 221
0.00000.57 209 0.64" 0.10 271
0.53" 0.00000.90 114 0.62" 0.05 162
0.00010.59 89 0.55"0.06 172 0.39*'
0.42"000010.90 63 0.60** 0.02 180
0.51" 000010.91 8073" 0.00 155
0.0001' 0.92 -25 0.81" 0.00 261 0.61"
045"0.00010.91 25 0.83 0.00 311
0.49*' O00010.88 94 0.75" 0.03 310
0.00010.90 105 0.72" 0.05 373
0.40" 0.00010.91 130 0.66"0.06 337
0.00010.85 59 0.62" 0.01 341
0.40" 0.00010.56 47 0.74" 0.01 377
0.0000 089 -15 0.76" 0.00 199
0.550.0000 089 -105 0.86 0.04 187
0.00010.89 91 0.93 0.01 228
0.84 119 0.70"0.02
Motes: (') indicatesanestimateof U or k1that issignificantLydifferent from zero at5 percent.
C")indicatesanestimat, ofk or k0that is significantly different from isilty at 5 percent.33
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